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Dynamic Common Law and
Technological Change: The
Classification of Bitcoin
Shawn Bayern*
Abstract
Most legal analysis of Bitcoin has addressed public-law and
regulatory matters, such as taxation, securities regulation, and
money laundering. This essay considers some questions that
Bitcoin raises from a private-law perspective, and it aims to show
that technological innovation may highlight problems with
conceptualistic, classical rules of private law.
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I. Introduction
It is tempting, in considering how the law should regulate
Bitcoin, to start by trying to categorize it: Is it a commodity? A
collectible? A currency? A security?1 While categorization of a new
technology can be useful in fashioning responses to it, the
enterprise is at heart conceptualistic rather than functional: the
question invites scrutiny of definitions rather than policies and of
the relationship between legal rules rather than the results of
applying them. Interestingly, too, most of the existing attempts to
categorize Bitcoin implicate its regulatory treatment; they are
essentially public-law proposals. So, for example, there has been
a lot of attention—for good reason—on questions of how to tax
Bitcoins, of how they interact with payment-processing
regulations, and so forth.2 There has been relatively little
attention on the core private-law questions that Bitcoin raises.
This essay begins to address some private-law questions
concerning Bitcoin. For example, what rights does holding a
Bitcoin confer, and against whom? Are the rights contractual, and
to what extent is a bitcoin a chose in action?3 What is the best
way to enforce the rights associated with Bitcoin? In starting to
address these questions, I suggest a broader, more theoretical
thesis, which is that existing, historical private-law categories
need not be functionally useful. Positive law is just positive law,

* Larry & Joyce Beltz Professor, Florida State University College of Law.
B.S., Yale University, Computer Science; J.D., University of California,
Berkeley School of Law. Thanks to Rob Atkinson and Don Weidner for helpful
discussions.
1. For the first thorough attempts to classify Bitcoin under existing
United States regulations, see Reuben Grinberg, Bitcoin: An Innovative
Alternative Digital Currency, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 159, 181–206 (2012).
2. See Omri Marian, Are Cryptocurrencies Super Tax Havens?, 112 MICH.
L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 38, 41–48 (2013) (discussing Bitcoin’s potential effects
on the enforcement of tax regulations); Grinberg, supra note 1, at 181–206
(providing an overview of the financial regulations that may govern Bitcoin); see
generally Rhys Bollen, The Legal Status of Online Currencies: Are Bitcoins the
Future?, 24 J. BANKING & FIN. L. & PRAC. 272 (2013) (providing general
regulatory discussions).
3. See infra note 7 and accompanying text (explaining that a “chose in
action” is a right to sue for possession or recovery of personal property, damages,
or a debt).
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and one nice thing about new technologies like Bitcoin is that
they can help us see limitations in our classical categories.
II. Holding Bitcoins: An Ambiguous Concept
To begin with, it is important to disaggregate the concept of
“holding bitcoins” in the first place. To do this, it will be necessary
to review briefly how Bitcoin works technologically.4
Bitcoin is simply software that is run on a decentralized
collection of computer systems. Anyone can download and run it.
This software, in coordination with other copies of itself running
around the world, generates and records units of account known
as “bitcoins,” much in the way that a distributed computer game
might record points for its players.5 Bitcoins, however, have come
to have financial value; people buy and sell them on financial
exchanges scattered throughout the world, making and losing
significant amounts of money. Bitcoins have value at least in part
because the software (if it works properly, as it has for the most
part done so far) ensures (1) their scarcity (people cannot
arbitrarily create Bitcoins; they arise only through the
expenditure of real computing power, as judged reliably by the
Bitcoin software); (2) their security (transmitting bitcoins
requires knowledge of their “secret key,” a number that it is
statistically impossible to guess); and (3) the ability to transmit
them with relative ease.6
This brief description is technologically accurate and matches
the ways that people commonly discuss Bitcoin; that is, it is
common to speak of “buying a bitcoin” or “holding a bitcoin” (as
an investment). But the description is legally imprecise in an
4. I have provided a slightly more technical overview for legal audiences
in Shawn Bayern, Of Bitcoins, Independently Wealthy Software, and the ZeroMember
LLC,
108
NW.
U.
L.
REV.
ONLINE
257
(2014),
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/online/2014/6/Bayern.pdf. For the
initial technological overview of Bitcoin written by its creator, see SATOSHI
NAKAMOTO, BITCOIN: A PEER-TO-PEER ELECTRONIC CASH SYSTEM (2008),
http://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf.
5. I follow here the increasingly popular convention of referring to the
technology as Bitcoin and to the assets the technology creates as bitcoins.
6. See Bayern, supra note 4, at 259–64 (providing a more extensive
introduction to several technical features of Bitcoin that may be relevant to
lawyers).
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important way that has received little academic attention. In
particular, what does it mean to “hold a bitcoin”?
The answer depends on precisely how the bitcoin is held.
Hard statistics are likely unavailable, but many and perhaps
most people who “hold” (or “own” or “buy”) bitcoins have done so
without running a copy of Bitcoin software that directly
participates in the Bitcoin network and without setting up the
cryptographic framework that would be necessary to safeguard
the private numbers—“keys”—that confer the ability to transfer
bitcoins on the Bitcoin network. Instead, many people who have
purchased bitcoins simply keep an account on a website that
operates as a kind of informal bank or broker. The website
reports a financial balance to the investor, and the investor at
that point may think “I own 100 bitcoins.” In thinking that, the
investor presumably means that he or she has taken a financial
position corresponding to the ownership of bitcoins—that is, that
he or she is making a particular (short-term or long-term) bet.
III. Bitcoins as a Contract Right
As far as the Bitcoin software is concerned, however, the
investor does not have control over any bitcoins. For example,
there is nothing the investor can do, technologically, to compel
the website to return the bitcoins. Similarly, as a matter of law,
the investor probably does not “own” any bitcoins, at least not in
the sense of having title to personal property corresponding
directly to bitcoins. What the investor has is simply a contract
right against the operator of the website—what was classically,
at common law, called a chose (i.e., thing) in action.7 This sort of
right is meaningfully different from having possession of personal
property. For one thing, it is subject to a risk of default—if, for
example, the website becomes insolvent, as has happened many
times in Bitcoin’s short history. For another, a contract right is
not identical, economically or legally, to possession; a claim must
7. See W. S. Holdsworth, The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action
by the Common Law, 33 HARV. L. REV. 997, 997 (1920) (“In its primary sense the
term ‘chose in action’ includes all rights which are enforceable by action—rights
to debts of all kinds, and rights of action on a contract or a right to damages for
its breach . . . .”).
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be fought, won, and enforced—and legal rules concerning
enforcement may well limit the economic value of the right if, for
example, they restrict the award of specific performance in favor
of an objective measurement of expectation damages.
In this sense, keeping a bitcoin on deposit with a Bitcoin
exchange or other online service is somewhat similar to keeping
dollars on deposit at a bank.8 But there are several important
differences. One, of course, is simply regulatory: banks are highly
regulated and are insured; Bitcoin exchanges are neither.
Another difference is technical and theoretical: perhaps “deposit”
is a notion that is or ought to be restricted to regulated banks.9
But the most important difference between holding dollars at a
bank and holding bitcoins at a Bitcoin exchange is that the
contract right at issue in both cases need not be enforced in the
same way. A deposit of dollars at a bank does not raise, in most
cases, significant questions concerning the appropriate contract
remedy.10 This is mainly because expectation damages are
denominated in dollars and are, as a result, a convenient remedy
for breach of an agreement to keep dollars on deposit; a bank’s
failure to pay back a $200 deposit easily leads to a judgment of
$200. Specific performance is typically unavailable to support
recovery of a bank deposit because it is generally unavailable
when the breached duty was simply to pay a fixed sum of
money.11
8. See Rhys Bollen, What is a Deposit (and Why Does It Matter)?, 13
MURDOCH U. ELECTRONIC J. L. 202, 206 (2006) (“The right to repayment the
customer holds in relation to money deposited is a chose in action.”).
9. See id. at 207 (“Some writers have questioned whether non-traditional
banking products and other payment facilities are deposits. For example, do
stored value cards and stores of digital cash, particularly if held by an ADI
[Authorised Deposit-taking Institution] on behalf of a customer, constitute a
deposit?”).
10. Generally, a depositor’s claim against a bank is simply a contractual
right. See, e.g., Dektor v. Overbrook Nat’l Bank, 10 F. Supp. 894, 896 (E.D. Pa.
1934) (“The money deposited becomes the property of the bank, and the plaintiff
acquires a contract right. The relation created is that of debtor and creditor.
There is no express contract, but the terms are all implied. They arise from and
are defined by the established usages of banking practice.”); 10 AM. JUR. 2D
Banks and Financial Institutions § 640 (1963) (“The term ‘deposit,’ when used in
connection
with
a
banking
transaction,
denotes
a
contractual
relationship . . . .”).
11. See ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 63.7 (Joseph M. Perillo
ed.) (1979)
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It would be a mistake to generalize from bank deposits to
bitcoin deposits, however, and to assume that expectation
damages are sufficient in the case of a failure to repay a debt of
bitcoins. Indeed, specific performance would probably be a more
appropriate default remedy for contracts to pay bitcoins.
For one thing, doctrinally speaking, the unavailability of
specific performance in cases where the breached duty was
simply to transfer a fixed sum of dollars probably tells us little
about the appropriateness of specific performance in general. In
such cases, the difference between specific performance and
damages is exceedingly minimal, at least if the enforcement
mechanism for damages is sufficiently effective against a
judgment debtor who has the capacity to satisfy the judgment.
There has been some recent discussion emphasizing the
theoretical differences between expectation damages and specific
performance in cases like these, but I believe these differences
amount to very little in practice. For example, Nathan Oman has
recently advanced the counterintuitive thesis that defendants
have no legal duty to pay judgments, a proposition he supports by
observing that a judgment for damages “does not give rise to any
additional liability or other sanction.”12 I believe this claim is
untrue, however. Professor Oman discusses a Vermont statute
that contradicts this position, but he argues that “no other state
seems to have followed Vermont in making an injunctive remedy
available to collect ordinary debts.”13 This, however, is incorrect;
Vermont’s statute is not in fact atypical.14 The better view is
At one extreme, is the case of money debts or other unilateral
contracts for the mere payment of money, [where] there is generally
no difficulty in determining the amount of damages. The action of
debt at common law in these cases was as truly an action for specific
performance as is a decree in equity, even though the mode of
enforcing the judgment was different from the mode of enforcing the
decree. The judgment is regarded as an adequate remedy. A suit for
specific performance, in so far as that involves any difference from
the money judgment, is not maintainable.
See also id. § 63.15 (“It is seldom that money damages would not be an adequate
remedy for breach of a contract to lend money. Specific performance has
therefore been refused in most cases of this sort.”).
12. Nathan B. Oman, Why There Is No Duty To Pay Damages: Powers,
Duties, and Private Law, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 137, 152 (2011).
13. Id. at 154–55.
14. Compare VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5537 (2012) (“Failure to make such
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simply that when a judgment for damages is insufficient to
enforce a duty to pay money, courts relatively easily grant
specific performance—either instead of such a judgment (if its
inadequacy is apparent beforehand) or afterwards (via a
mechanism commonly known as a “turnover order”).15 There is
not a rigid conceptual line between the two remedies; the
difference in their availability is largely the result of practical
considerations.16
Normatively speaking, specific performance is an excellent
mechanism to enforce a legal duty to transfer bitcoins. Consider
the factors in favor of modern decrees of specific performance that
Corbin’s treatise lists:
Among the factors to be considered in granting a decree for
specific performance, the most important seem to be the
following: difficulty and uncertainty in determining the
amount of damages to be awarded for the defendant's breach,
difficulty and uncertainty in the collection of damages after
payments [as the court deems appropriate] may be considered civil contempt of
court.”), with CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 699.040 (West 2012) (allowing a judgment
creditor to apply to the court, upon a “showing of need,” for a court order
directing that the judgment debtor transfer property to the judgment creditor to
satisfy a claim). New York and California have comparable statutes:
Upon motion of the judgment creditor, upon notice to the judgment
debtor, where it is shown that the judgment debtor is in possession or
custody of money or other personal property in which he has an
interest, the court shall order that the judgment debtor pay the
money, or so much of it as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment, to the
judgment creditor and, if the amount to be so paid is insufficient to
satisfy the judgment, to deliver any other personal property, or so
much of it as is of sufficient value to satisfy the judgment, to a
designated sheriff.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5225 (MCKINNEY 2012).
15. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1207 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “turnover
order” as “[a]n order by which the court commands a judgment debtor to
surrender certain property to a judgment creditor”). Such an order is usually
“directed to property that is difficult to acquire by the ordinary judgmentcollection process, such as share certificates and accounts receivable.” Id.
16. Cf. CORBIN, supra note 11, § 63.7
Even the fact that the defendant’s assets will not be subject to
execution because of statutory exemption or because of location in
another state may prevent damages from being an adequate remedy
and, therefore, make it desirable to prevent the injury rather than to
leave the injured party to an uncollectible judgment for compensation
after the injury occurs.
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they are awarded, the insufficiency of money damages to
obtain the duplicate or the substantial equivalent of the
promised performance, either because the subject matter of
the contract is unique or rare and cannot easily be duplicated
or because the obtaining of a substantial equivalent involves
difficulty, delay, and inconvenience.17

A debt denominated in bitcoins satisfies nearly all of these
criteria. Because of the rapidly changing market value of bitcoins
(denominated in dollars and other traditional currencies),18
calculating damages risks significant error. Because purchasing
bitcoins with dollars may involve significant transfer costs, risks
of theft, and so on, an award of dollars is insufficient to address
the expectations of a plaintiff, who may have intended to hold
bitcoins rather than dollars.19
In short, emphasizing the similarity between bitcoins and
dollars—or generalizing from a definition of bitcoin as “money”
where the definition suits an unrelated context—would be the
wrong way to determine a functional remedy in the case of
contracts to transfer bitcoins, including contracts involving the
deposit of bitcoins. A functional analysis based on the interests
and expectations of the parties leads fairly easily to an award of
specific performance in such cases.
IV. Direct Ownership of Bitcoins: A New Class of Private Property
The upshot of Part III is that holding a bitcoin using a
financial intermediary is conceptually similar to owning
traditional currency using a financial intermediary, except that
the conceptual similarity should not cloud important distinctions
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Nathaniel Popper, In the Murky World of Bitcoin, Fraud Is
Quicker Than the Law, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2013, 6:58 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/12/05/in-the-murky-world-of-bitcoin-fraud-isquicker-than-the-law/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 (last visited Aug. 28, 2014)
(noting tremendous fluctuations in the price of bitcoins) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
19. For a broader discussion of the purposes of remedies in contract law,
see Shawn J. Bayern & Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Expectation Measure and Its
Discontents, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1 (arguing in favor of a subjective
“indifference principle” under which remedies are judged by their ability to
make the promisee indifferent between performance and breach).
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that should drive normative differences in enforcement—namely,
the availability of specific performance in claims for breach of
contract involving bitcoins.
Direct ownership of bitcoins raises different legal problems.
A central technological innovation of the Bitcoin software is that
owning a bitcoin directly—and I will discuss in a moment
precisely what such ownership entails—amounts itself to
possessing something of value, rather than merely having a claim
against someone else for a preexisting, underlying asset.20 That
is, as investors over the past several years have recognized,
cryptocurrencies are a new class of asset; they are not simply
proxies for or claims upon existing assets. Consequently, while
deposits over the years have been either bailments or contractual
debts,21 in a meaningful sense the ownership of a bitcoin is
neither.
Of course, there are many familiar types of intangible
personal property that cannot easily be reduced to debts or
bailments, such as a share of stock22 or a partnership interest.23
In a sense, owning a bitcoin resembles such ownership interests,
except that the distributed network of computer systems running
Bitcoin is not a legal entity or even a legal aggregation of any
kind; a bitcoin is, in at least a poetic sense, a share in an
informally organized social process.
This Part considers more precisely the legal nature of bitcoin
ownership, but it does so only to make a larger jurisprudential
point, which is that considering the legal “nature” of ownership is
only a very preliminary first step in using the private law to
regulate a new technology. Categorizing Bitcoin is little more
20. For a pre-Bitcoin analysis of electronic payment systems, analogizing
them to 19th-century banknotes and suggesting that a classical legal regime
should govern them, see James Steven Rogers, The New Old Law of Electronic
Money, 58 SMU L. REV. 1253 (2005).
21. See, e.g., Bollen, supra note 8, at 203 (“The goldsmith had evolved to a
banker of sorts—the receipt evolved from a record of bailment to record of
debt.”).
22. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 159 (2014) (“The shares of stock in
every corporation shall be deemed personal property . . . .”).
23. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 502 (1997) (“The only transferable interest of a
partner in the partnership is the partner’s share of the profits and losses of the
partnership and the partner’s right to receive distributions. The interest is
personal property.”).
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than a pedagogical methodology to aid in its understanding; it
cannot determine sound legal policy.24
This Part considers these matters in turn; Part IV.A sheds
more light on bitcoin ownership, and Part IV.B argues that the
“legal nature” of bitcoin ownership is probably not very important
in developing common-law rules that address Bitcoin.
A. Bitcoins and Private-Law Rights
As noted earlier, owning a bitcoin has something in common
with owning a stock or a partnership interest; both are intangible
personal property that can be valuable on their own without
direct implication of further legal relationships. So, for example,
shares in corporate stock may have value even though there is no
present claim to dividends or even an immediately recognizable
prospect of a dividend payment. But stock in a company and
other similar forms of intangible personal property are different
from bitcoin in an important way, which is that ownership of
corporate stock confers transactional rights (such as, for example,
a right to vote for corporate directors or to receive a declared
dividend), whereas on closer inspection ownership of a bitcoin
does not itself confer a legal right against participants in the
Bitcoin system. Note that owning a bitcoin does confer rights
generally—for example, as with most property, the right against
interference with “possession” from the world at large.25 But a
bitcoin does not represent a transactional or organizational right
in the way that shares of stock or a partnership interest do.
To understand why this is so, it may be helpful to elaborate
what a bitcoin is in the first place. As discussed previously, a
bitcoin corresponds to no external asset, and it is not in fact
something that physically exists. A bitcoin is nothing more than a
convention established by a distributed algorithm, coordinated
24. Cf. Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical
Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 975, 1059 (“The logic
of rights is a human invention whose purpose is to preserve us from the notion
that we must make political and moral choices. To make conscious choices, it is
necessary to realize that we are making a choice.”).
25. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.0(6) (2014) (including “intangible
personal property” in the definition of property protected by the laws concerning
theft and related offenses).
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securely and reliably by many copies of the same software
running throughout the world. There is an important sense in
which individual bitcoins do not even exist at all; if I own, for
example, 2.55 bitcoins, I do not have 2.55 times more of
something physical than if I owned a single bitcoin. What I have
specifically is knowledge of a long secret number that confers the
ability to transfer a logical amount of value (2.55 bitcoins) to any
arbitrary Bitcoin address of my choosing. On technical and
physical grounds, I have exactly the same thing if I own any
number of other bitcoins; the economic difference is simply that
the distributed system running the Bitcoin software
acknowledges my ability to send one amount rather than another.
These amounts have come to have financial value outside the
Bitcoin system itself, but that value is not something the Bitcoin
software particularly cares about; the Bitcoin software does not
know the exchange rate between a bitcoin and a dollar. It simply
processes transfers of arbitrary amounts.26
In Hohfeldian terms,27 given merely my knowledge of a secret
key for a certain amount of bitcoins, there is nobody associated
with Bitcoin against whom I have a claim-right, and conversely
nobody has a duty to me—apart from the general duty to refrain
from interfering with intangible personal property. Those
running the Bitcoin software are free to ignore my attempts to
transfer bitcoins to a new bitcoin address. They have no contract
with me, implied or otherwise. They are free to ignore me, to
dispute my ownership of bitcoins on technological grounds, and so
on. The Bitcoin system works only because there are
mathematically verifiable ways to convince other honest users of
the software that my own bitcoins represent a legitimate stake
(and because there is a social trust that enough honest people will
continue to run the Bitcoin software). But, for example, if all the
current participants in Bitcoin chose not to run the Bitcoin
26. One minor qualification to the notion that Bitcoin processes all
amounts identically is that the leading modern Bitcoin client has introduced
rules that prevent the sending of very small amounts under certain conditions
without the payment, in bitcoins, of a transaction fee. See Bitcoin Transaction
Fees Explained, BITCOIN FEES, http://bitcoinfees.com (last updated Feb. 12, 2014)
(last visited Aug. 12, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
27. See Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 28–37 (1913).
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software, or if individual participants ran modifications of the
software that operated on rules different from those that I
initially understood, it is unlikely I have any recourse. In this
sense, a bitcoin is not a right against the other users (qua users)
of the Bitcoin network.28
What is bitcoin ownership, then? It is not a contract or a
bailment. Indeed, it is probably not a chose in action of any kind
because it represents no claim against others. (It perhaps
resembles a Hohfeldian power—that is, an ability to change
others’ legally protected rights.)29 In a meaningful sense, it is
something new.
B. Theory and Function in Common Law Responses to
Technological Change
Because Bitcoin is something new, it does not fit neatly into
classical categories. It is striking to observe, even within the last
hundred years, how several fundamental rules of private
property, and the common law more generally, have moved away
from their older conceptualism. For example, even the 1900s saw
significant change with regard to the legal treatment of the
conversion30 and assignability31 of choses in action.
28. It is interesting to consider under what circumstances group
participation in modification to the Bitcoin software to violate the expectations
of Bitcoin users would amount to conversion, fraud, or any other actionable
harm. That discussion is outside the scope of this essay, but I am skeptical that
any such behavior is in fact wrongful—any more than setting up copies of the
Bitcoin software that behave differently (a practice on which other
cryptocurrencies like Litecoin depend)—is wrongful. While interference with
individually owned bitcoins via a technological vulnerability on the owner’s
computer system probably amounts to conversion, influencing the evolution of
the Bitcoin software is likely a risk that bitcoin owners reasonably intend to
take. In some sense, owning a bitcoin is a tradeoff compared to owning other
assets: in owning a dollar, an individual takes some risk that the dollar will be
devalued by virtue of the central-banking functions of the Federal Reserve; in
owning a bitcoin, he or she takes some risk that the bitcoin will be devalued by
operation of the decentralized “banking” functions associated with the Bitcoin
software itself.
29. Hohfeld, supra note 27, at 44–48.
30. See, e.g., Lester Rubin, Comment, Conversion of Choses in Action, 10
FORDHAM L. REV. 415, 415–19 (1941) (documenting changes in the law governing
the conversion of choses in action).
31. See generally LON L. FULLER & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC
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The trend toward functional rather than formal analysis in
the common law demonstrates the importance of not relying
excessively on categorization when determining legal rules that
will govern bitcoin ownership, bitcoin transactions, and so on. In
functional terms, a bitcoin is an important economic right to
many who participate in the network. It is clearly proper to
criminalize its theft. It matches parties’ expectations if bitcoin is
treated as intangible, moveable personal property. Contracts
involving bitcoins should be enforced.
In modern private law, the remaining difficulties arise
largely because of conceptualism and categorization that statutes
create or preserve. So, for example, is a bitcoin a “good” under
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code? Article 2 defines
goods as “all things (including specially manufactured goods)
which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for
sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid,
investment securities (Article 8) and things in action.”32 Under
this definition, much will depend on non-functional decisions
about whether bitcoins are “moveable,” whether I am correct that
a bitcoin is not a thing (i.e., chose) in action, whether it is
“money,” and so on. This is unfortunate because little should turn
on such arbitrary matters, and clearly the UCC did not
contemplate them. In common law alone, there would be little
reason to ask these questions.

CONTRACT LAW 1087–91 (8th ed. 2006).
32. U.C.C. § 2-105 (2013).

